Introduction
The question of whether constructive mathematics can provide an adequate basis for physics has been debated recently by Hellman [1993a Hellman [ ,b, 1997 Hellman [ , 1998 ], Bridges [1995] , Billinge [1997 Billinge [ , 2000 , Richman & Bridges [1999] and Richman [2000] . This debate has revolved around the question of how many of the theorems of mathematical physics can be reformulated and proved without use of the principle of excluded middle. It is implicitly assumed that constructivism has nothing new to offer physics and that its goal is merely to mimic conventional mathematical physics as closely as possible without using the principle of excluded middle. This is too narrow a view of the matter, for two reasons.
First, constructive mathematics cannot be viewed simply as a subset of platonist (so-called classical³) mathematics: constructivism is a completely different perspective on mathematics, which produces results that happen to overlap roughly with those of platonist mathematics but are stronger in some respects and weaker in others (in ways that vary between the different schools of constructivism [Bridges & Richman, 1987] ). The large degree of overlap should not blind us to the fact that constructivists and platonists mean completely different things by the logical connectives and quantifiers and have different notions of function and set. A genuinely constructivist reconstruction of physics would have to reconsider the fundamental concepts of space, time, measurement and quantity from a constructive perspective, and may well produce results very different from those of conventional mathematical physics. Hellman [1998] refers briefly to this possibility: the constructivist may seek to replace mathematical physics as we know it with a thoroughgoing constructive mathematical physics, and claim that the replacement is adequate to any legitimate purpose. It is noteworthy, however, how undeveloped such a project has remained since Brouwer.³ This is true, and the reasons are obvious: the number of convinced constructivists is small and they have been largely preoccupied until now with the reconstruction of pure mathematics.
Secondly, one should beware of the assumption that platonist mathematics is the most convenient possible basis for physics. Platonist mathematical physics encounters frequent awkwardness in its handling of infinity. One example is the infinite self-energy of a particle in classical electromagnetic or gravitational theory; examples in quantum field theory include the infinite zero-point energy of a field, Dirac delta functions, the procedure of quantising in a finite box (whose volume is allowed to tend to infinity at the end of the calculation), infinite renormalisation, perturbation series with zero radius of convergence, and path integrals. These features would make more sense if space-time were really finite or potentially infinite. When such awkwardnesses are encountered they are normally tolerated pending a more rigorous reconstruction of the mathematics or a more fundamental physical theory. It is possible that what is needed is a different conception of infinity, such as may be provided by constructivism.
No constructive version of physics exists today. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the options open to a constructivist attempting a reform of physics and to examine the possible obstacles in the way. Constructivists have a different view of infinity from platonists, at least in pure mathematics; I shall argue in Ü2 that this difference does not necessarily carry over to physical infinity, since we apprehend physical systems in a very different way from mathematical systems.
Hellman [1998] has argued that if one accepts even the logical possibility of physical infinities then one is also committed to the coherence of platonist mathematics; hence the constructivist must either reject physical infinity a priori or take a purely instrumentalist attitude to physics. I shall examine Hellman³s argument in Ü3, by considering the example of a countably infinite constellation of stars, and conclude that the constructivist has a wider range of options than this.
In Ü4 I consider the space-time continuum, which is usually conceived as an uncountable infinity of points and modelled using real numbers. I shall argue that there is a variety of apparently viable approaches the constructivist might take to representing this mathematically.
One general conclusion from this paper is that mathematical constructivism is compatible with a realistic attitude to the physical world. Constructivism provides a subtly different, and in some ways broader, perspective on the problem of theorising about the physical world from platonism.
Constructivism and infinity
It might be thought that, because physical theories are formulated using mathematics, any restrictions one places on mathematics transfer automatically to physics; thus, since constructivists reject completed infinities and the principle of excluded middle in mathematical theories, they must do the same in physical theories as well. This however would be to misunderstand the nature of the constructivist critique of mathematics. Constructivists do not ban any mathematical concept or form of mathematical argument for its own sake; they simply demand that whatever mathematics we use should have a well-defined meaning, and they believe that we are unable to give a platonistic meaning to theories of infinite systems in pure mathematics. Whether such theories can be given a meaning in a physical context is another question. For example, an expression such as there exists an x³ cannot be interpreted truth-functionally when x ranges over natural numbers; but perhaps it can when x ranges over physical objects.
Let us fix terminology before proceeding any further. By physical realism I mean the doctrine that our sensory experience is caused by a physical world, that we can speak meaningfully about this world (in particular, that we can refer unambiguously to objects or systems in the world), that the purpose of our scientific theories is to describe the world, and that the meaning of scientific statements is given by their truth conditions. Mathematical realism is an analogous doctrine for a mathematical world (except that the mathematical world is not assumed to produce sensory experience). Platonism is a form of mathematical realism that holds that the mathematical world is disjoint from the physical world.
Constructivism is a non-realist philosophy of mathematics, with many varieties [Bridges & Richman, 1987] . My own version of constructivism, which is an unorthodox kind of intuitionism, is expounded in detail in a recent book [Fletcher, 1998 ]; I shall pick out the points that are relevant to this paper and try to state them in a way that most constructivists could accept (see the book for full clarification and justification of the doctrines stated here). Constructivism has a negative thesis and a positive thesis. The negative thesis is that the platonist notion of mathematical infinity, and in particular the realist³s view of quantifiers as infinite conjunctions and disjunctions, is incoherent. The positive thesis is that mathematics can be adequately founded in terms of constructions (without tacit reliance on infinity).
It is important to identify precisely the source of the difference between the constructivist³s and the platonist³s attitude to mathematical infinity, in order to understand how it might apply to physical infinity. A platonist, asked to explicate the meaning of the quantifiers of Peano arithmetic, might proceed in the following sequence of steps.
Step 1. Define a zero object, 0, and a successor operation, S.
Step 2. Introduce the counting process, 0, S(0), S(S(0)), S(S(S(0))), , considered as an unending algorithm.
Step 3. Let N be the collection of everything that can be generated by this counting process.
Step 4. Let n A(n) be understood as the conjunction of all instances A(n), and n A(n) as the disjunction of all instances A(n), where n ranges over N.
(Alternatively, many platonists prefer to derive Peano arithmetic from some larger system such as second-order logic or set theory; in that case they must apply a procedure similar to the above to the larger system.) Now, constructivists accept steps 1 and 2 (known traditionally as potential infinity³) but refuse to accept the meaningfulness of step 3 (known as actual infinity³ or completed infinity³). Platonists actually recognise two kinds of completed infinity, namely sets and proper classes, but the distinction does not matter here since constructivists reject both.
The argument against step 3 used in Fletcher [1998, Chapter 3 ] is a reductio ad absurdum, which works as follows. Suppose, in accordance with mathematical realism, that we could grasp the standard model of Peano arithmetic, N; then we would also be able to grasp nonstandard models elementarily equivalent to N (these may be generated by a variety of techniques, such as ultrapowers of N, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, and Gödel³s completeness theorem). I argue that we are unable to distinguish the standard³ model from the nonstandard³ ones, and that in fact the notion of standardness is indeterminate. This undermines the original hypothesis that we could grasp the standard model. Can a similar reductio ad absurdum be applied to physical infinities? The argument begins by assuming physical realism. Our scientific theories cannot determine the structure of a physical system up to isomorphism (unless it is known to be finite), since an ultrapower of the physical system would satisfy just the same theories as the physical system. Nevertheless, there is no danger of confusing the physical system with the ultrapower, since we are able to interact causally with the physical system but not with the ultrapower, which is merely a mathematical system. (Moreover, a mathematical constructivist could consistently believe in the physical system but not in the ultrapower.) Hence the assumption of physical realism does not lead to the same semantic indeterminacy as the assumption of mathematical realism. Of course, I am well aware that the question of how we refer to physical objects and concepts, and whether we can do so unambiguously, is philosophically contentious. All I am saying is that nonstandard models don³t introduce a new argument for indeterminacy, as they do in the mathematical case.
Here I am disagreeing with Putnam [1980] , who believes that nonstandard models pose an equal difficulty for mathematical and physical realism. He argues that our total use of language³ does not fix a unique intended interpretation for our theories. Since he believes that our grasp of the meaning of our language is expressed exhaustively by our use of it, he concludes that our language is semantically ill-defined on a realist view. A physical realist, of course, would reply that there is a unique intended model, namely the physical world, and that we can speak meaningfully about the world even if we cannot fully grasp its structure. What distinguishes the physical world from the other models of our theories is that it is the only one with which we can interact causally. Moreover, we can distinguish physical systems as certain parts of the physical world. Of course, a platonist could make a similar response, claiming that there is a unique mathematical reality, perhaps adding that it is the source of our mathematical intuitions³ just as the physical world is the source of our sensations [Gödel, 1964] . But then the platonist still has the problem of distinguishing the standard N from the nonstandard models, all of which are part of mathematical reality and presumably are equally capable of generating intuitions in us: how do we tell which intuitions come from the standard model and which from the nonstandard models?
Hence there are significant differences between the mathematical and the physical cases, which are traceable to two sources: (i) physical systems can interact causally with our sense organs, whereas mathematical systems cannot; (ii) the techniques for constructing nonstandard models produce mathematical systems, not physical systems. As a result of the differences the argument for the negative thesis of constructivism fails when it is transferred from mathematical systems to physical systems. Let us turn to the positive thesis. Constructivists interpret the arithmetic quantifiers for every natural number³ and there exists a natural number³, which appear to refer to N, in an indirect way in terms of the counting algorithm. This requires a fundamental shift in the semantics of mathematical formulae. For a platonist, the meaning of a formula is given by its truth conditions; and a proof of a formula is a (formal or informal) argument showing that it is true. For a constructivist, the meaning of a formula is given by its proof conditions: that is to say, to specify the semantics of a formula A one must define the relation P proves A³, for arbitrary constructions P. A proof, in the constructive sense, is not like a platonist³s proof but is a certain kind of construction, characterised by structural induction on the formula A. There is no separate notion of constructive truth³; if constructivists describe a formula as true³ this is just a loose way of saying that they have a proof of it. Now, the analogous thesis for physical systems is that the meaning of a physical proposition is given by specifying what experimental observations would count as a verification of it. Such a verification principle was considered seriously by the logical empiricists, but even they concluded that it was unworkable [Carnap, 1963, pp. 57-58] . Certainly, a simple structural induction on the syntax of the proposition, which works for mathematical propositions, will not work for physical ones.
Thus neither the negative nor the positive thesis of constructivism can be applied, with any plausibility, to physical systems. Hence, apparently, the way is open for a constructivist to reject mathematical infinity while accepting physical infinity. Indeed, Hellman [1989, p. 30] quotes Dummett [1977, p. 57] as saying It is perfectly intelligible, even if in fact false, to say that there are infinitely many stars.³ This quotation must be taken with caution, however: it is not a statement of Dummett³s own opinion but is part of a possible platonist retort³ in an imaginary debate about mathematical infinity. Dummett certainly believes that different considerations apply to physical and mathematical infinities, but neither he nor other constructivists has taken a definite position on the intelligibility of physical infinity.
In Hellman³s view, a constructivist cannot accept the possibility of physical infinity while denying mathematical infinity. I shall examine his argument in the next section.
Modal structuralism and the Dedekind constellation
Benardete [1964, pp. 29-31, 58] suggested that mathematical infinity may be understood in terms of the ontological possibility of physical infinity, and hence mathematics may be reduced to modal logic. Hellman [1998] has used such a modal-structural interpretation as an argument against the negative thesis of constructivism. His procedure (introduced in an earlier book, Hellman [1989] , and developed in Hellman [1994 Hellman [ , 1996 ) can be illustrated by considering second-order Peano arithmetic, PA 2 , which can be expressed as a finite axiomatic system. A formula A of PA 2 is interpreted as
where Î PA 2 is the conjunction of the axioms of PA 2 and the superscript X, f means that the first-order quantifiers are relativised to X, the second-order quantifiers are relativised to the power-set of X, and f is substituted for the successor function. Hence the interpreting formula says that it is necessarily the case that every ω-sequence (X, f ) (that is, every model of PA 2 )
satisfies A. Accordingly, under this interpretation, arithmetic is not a theory about a single abstract domain, the natural number system, as it appears, but is really a theory about what necessarily holds in all possible ω-sequences. This provides a realist, though not platonist, semantics for arithmetic. Do any ω-sequences exist? None is known, but all Hellman claims is that such a system is logically possible, that is, it is possible that there exist an X and an f for which all the axioms of PA 2 hold:
From this he infers a bivalence theorem: for any formula A of PA 2 , either A X, f necessarily holds for all ω-sequences (X, f ) or ( A) X, f necessarily holds for all ω-sequences. Thus, under the modal-structural interpretation, propositions such as Goldbach³s conjecture have definite truth values even if we cannot determine them. Hellman cannot prove his claim that ω-sequences are possible but he regards it as a plausible working hypothesis. In Hellman [1989] he avoids specifying whether his possible ω-sequences are made of physical or mathematical objects: the nature of the objects is after all irrelevant in a structuralist interpretation. But it is difficult to understand what possible existence³ means for mathematical objects, since we have no idea of how mathematical facts could be contingent. To say that mathematical ω-sequences are possible is equivalent to saying that they actually (and necessarily) exist; hence modal structuralism reduces to ordinary structuralism. It makes more sense to interpret Hellman as asserting the possible existence of physical ω-sequences; and indeed it is this version of the argument that he uses in his 1998 paper against constructivism. He proposes the following dilemma for constructivists: if the possibility of physical ω-sequences is granted then arithmetic can be given a coherent realist meaning; if physical ω-sequences are declared to be impossible then this seems to represent an implausible a priori limitation on the physical world. Now, a constructivist would certainly not accept Hellman³s proof of his bivalence theorem in its present form. Hellman uses the modal logic S5, together with an accumulation principle³,
The proof is not constructively valid as it uses the principle of excluded middle on modal formulae. However, it can be rephrased using an intuitionistic version of S5 modal reasoning; we need to assume a restricted form of the excluded middle,
for formulae A of PA 2 , and in place of the accumulation principle we require
which says that any two ω-sequences, (X, f ) and (X ¼ , f ¼ ), satisfy the same formulae A, even if they are in different possible worlds³. The justification for this is by structural induction on the formula A, involving the construction of an isomorphism between (X, f ) and (X ¼ , f ¼ ). Thus Hellman³s conclusion follows constructively from propositions (1), (2) and (3) above.
I have suggested in Ü2 that constructivism is compatible with physical realism, according to which the meaning of a statement about physical objects such as A X,f is given by truth conditions; on this view it is natural to interpret and truth-functionally, and hence proposition (2) holds. (At least, this is clear for first-order A; there is a doubt about the meaningfulness of second-order quantifiers, which will be discussed below.) Proposition (3) also seems fairly plausible, at least if one sets aside any reservations about second-order quantifiers and the way they interact with modal operators.
Thus it would seem that the most promising response for the constructivist is to question proposition (1), which asserts the possible existence of a physical ω-sequence. What does possible³ mean here? Hale [1996] argues that it cannot merely mean that there is no known reason for ruling out physical ω-sequences, and moreover that proof-theoretic and modeltheoretic arguments are no use here. To convince ourselves that a proposition is possibly true we must describe an imaginary state of affairs in which the proposition holds; our description has to make it clear (a) that the state of affairs is possible and (b) that the proposition would hold in it. In the case where the proposition states the existence of a physical ω-sequence Hale believes that requirement (b) cannot be met: the modal structuralist must supply a description -necessarily finite -of a possible situation, no empirically adequate theoretical account of which could avoid postulating the existence of a completed concrete ω-sequence³, but it beggars belief³ that a finite description could accomplish this.
Hale³s argument is not made from a constructivist perspective; nevertheless, there are reasons for thinking that this kind of argument would be more convincing to a constructivist than to a platonist. A constructivist could only understand the modal operators by treating them in a similar way to the quantifiers in arithmetic. That is, a proof of Ù ØA is a general method for proving A for any given state of affairs, whereas a proof of A is a description of a state of affairs together with a proof of A for it. This means that the semantics of modal statements is given by proof conditions rather than truth conditions. It follows that the only way to prove the possible existence of a physical ω-sequence is to specify a suitable state of affairs. This was a necessary assumption in Hale³s argument. For a constructivist it follows directly from the meaning of the modal operators; for a platonist it is an implausible assumption because one might prove possible existence by showing the absurdity of necessary non-existence.
Hale³s argument can be strengthened further by considering requirement (a): what does a description have to be like to make it clear that it describes a possible state of affairs? The five Peano axioms themselves could be taken as a description of a physical ω-sequence, but of course such a description does not establish that the ω-sequence is possible. We require a description that is sufficiently explicit to make clear that it contains no hidden contradiction or obscurity. What this requirement amounts to depends on the kind of situation we are describing, but in the case of a world of particles it would be sufficient to specify the positions, shapes, sizes, and other relevant attributes of the particles; provided one did not assign two values for the same attribute to any particle, this would manifestly describe a possible state of affairs. Any more concise description that attempted to fix the attributes of many particles (especially infinitely many particles) in a single statement would run the risk of containing hidden contradictions or obscurities. So to be safe our description must specify all the relevant particle attributes one by one. A different kind of world, containing things other than particles, would require a different kind of description. We may be in danger here of relying on a raw and inarticulate intuition of possibility³, which Hale regards as clearly unsatisfactory³, but this is a danger well worth accepting, in my view, if our notions of physical possibility and necessity are to have any foundation at all.
If my account of the requirements for proving possibility is correct then to prove the possible existence of a physical ω-sequence we must provide a description that mentions all the elements of the sequence individually, which is impossible because all descriptions are finite. A platonist could get round the problem by providing a finite meta-description³ of an abstract ω-sequence which would serve as an infinite description or picture of the physical ω-sequence; it is plausible that giving a meta-description of a description is just as good as giving the description directly. Thus, platonists are likely to regard physical ω-sequences as obviously possible, because it is so easy for them to describe a completely explicit description of one; but constructivists have no reason for regarding physical ω-sequences as possible.
Thus there are reasons peculiar to constructivism for not accepting the possible existence of a physical ω-sequence.
Nevertheless, although I am refusing to concede that physical ω-sequences are possible, I am not saying that they are impossible either. Suppose that one day a scientist claims to have discovered a physical ω-sequence. It is helpful to consider a concrete case. Suppose an astronomer proposes the hypothesis that a certain collection of stars (call it the Dedekind constellation), satisfies the Peano axioms, i.e., the following statements: (i) there is a star in the constellation called Zero; (ii) every star in the constellation has a unique successor star in the constellation; (iii) the Zero star is not the successor of any star of the constellation; (iv) no two stars of the constellation have the same successor; (v) any part of the constellation that includes Zero and is closed under successor is the whole constellation.
(We may suppose that x is the successor of y³ means that x is one light-year away from y in the direction directly away from Sagittarius.) We now have the empirical hypothesis
where D is the constellation and S is the successor relation described. Suppose that this proposition can be established empirically. Then it can be used in place of proposition (1) in Hellman³s argument to provide an interpretation of arithmetic under which all instances of the principle of excluded middle hold (albeit only as empirical truths, since they depend on
. Goldbach³s conjecture, for example, would be determinately either true or false in arithmetic because it has a determinate truth-value in the Dedekind constellation (by proposition (2)) and has the same truth-value in any other possible physical ω-sequence (by proposition (3)). This would be an embarrassment to the constructivist, who believes that it is impossible to give a truth-conditional meaning to the formulae of arithmetic. Can a constructivist predict that this state of affairs will never arise, that is, that astronomers will never have good empirical grounds for the hypothesis that a constellation satisfies Peano³s axioms? Or should a constructivist try to ban astronomers from considering such hypotheses? Constructivism does not entail any constraints on the way the physical world can be, but it does entail limitations on what we, with our finite cognitive resources, can mean. Hence a constructivist, if confronted by astronomers talking about the Dedekind constellation, would challenge the meaningfulness of the hypothesis If a part³ is understood as a set, that is, an object at level 1 of a Zermelo-Fraenkel hierarchy in which the ur-elements are stars, then a constructivist would regard the totality of parts as ill-defined, just like the totality of natural numbers. Likewise if a part is understood intensionally as a possible way of partitioning the constellation into two then the constructivist would not accept the totality of all possible ways of partitioning. But what if a part is understood mereologically, as a scattered physical object consisting of some of the stars of the constellation (cf Hellman [1996] )? In that case the distinction between second-order and firstorder quantification becomes a little blurred: perhaps for any part³ is no more objectionable than for any star³. The suggestion here is that the physical situation provides not just a well-defined totality of stars but also a well-defined totality of parts; and hence the for any part³ quantifier has a truth-conditional semantics for this particular constellation.
This claim is far from compelling, but let us grant it for the sake of argument. It provides a sort of power-set of the constellation D, but there is no reason to believe that it is the full power-set of D; hence the fact that D satisfies the induction axiom with respect to this for any part³ quantifier does not imply that D is a standard model of Peano arithmetic. Indeed, the constructivist maintains that the concepts of being the full³ power-set of D and being a standard³ model of PA 2 are ill-defined.
It is hard to see how the astronomers could counter this argument. Could empirical evidence be used to establish that the totality of parts is the full power-set? Philosophers of science have proposed many theories of how hypotheses are confirmed by empirical evidence. It used to be widely believed that a hypothesis was confirmed by deriving from it logical consequences that were observationally testable [Hempel, 1966] . Quine [1953] believed that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body³. According to Glymour [1980] a hypothesis is confirmed by deriving instances of it from experimental results, with the help of auxiliary hypotheses (see also Earman [1983] ). Other philosophers of science say that a hypothesis is confirmed if it provides the best explanation of the available evidence [Kitcher & Salmon, 1989; Lipton, 1991; Niiniluoto, 1999] . On all of these theories, the confirmation of a hypothesis depends on its deductive and causal relations to other hypotheses and empirical evidence. These deductive and causal relations are not affected by the question of whether for any part³ is interpreted as a full second-order quantifier.
It follows not only that the astronomers cannot show that their constellation is a standard model but that they have no need to. The question of standardness does not affect the scientific usefulness of their theory. However, it does undermine Hellman³s attempt to give an interpretation to arithmetic. For there is no guarantee that all other possible physical ω-sequences are isomorphic to the Dedekind constellation (since each one will have its own totality of parts); Goldbach³s conjecture could be true in some of these physical models and false in others, for all we know. Even if, as a matter of fact, all the ω-sequences in the physical universe are isomorphic (perhaps as a consequence of the fact that they are all embedded in the same space-time continuum), they are merely contingently so; and that is not enough to salvage proposition (3) in the proof of the bivalence theorem.
The conclusion from this discussion is that mathematical infinity cannot be derived from physical infinity. I have given the benefit of the doubt to the modal-structuralist argument at every step, by granting a realist interpretation of physical statements, the principle of excluded middle for physical statements, a hypothetical infinite constellation of stars, and a well-defined physical totality of parts of the constellation; a constructivist is not obliged to make all these concessions, of course, but even if one does, a truth-conditional interpretation of arithmetic still does not follow.
A constructivist can coherently postulate an inexhaustible constellation of stars (that is, one satisfying the first four Peano axioms), and can arguably also postulate that it satisfies the induction axiom with respect to some totality of parts (if this can be given an appropriate physical grounding), while dismissing as meaningless the question of whether it is a standard model. Constructivism does not prevent scientists from considering infinite physical systems; it merely encourages them to consider a richer variety of non-isomorphic possibilities.
The continuum
My second test case is the space-time continuum. This raises problems not encountered with the Dedekind constellation, since the continuum is usually assumed to be infinitely divisible and to be an uncountable set of points, modelled by the real number system. If one simply replaces platonistic real number theory by some variety of constructive real number theory [as in Bridges & Richman, 1987] then mathematical physics does not work as well; even elementary properties such as the trichotomy law for the ordering of reals no longer hold, a point stressed by Hellman [1998] .
As I have argued in the previous sections, it is sometimes possible to give a physical meaning to a mathematical theory even though we cannot give it a pure-mathematical meaning. Hence it is not out of the question that a constructively acceptable way could be found of applying the usual theory of the real numbers to space-time. However, there are alternative ways of handling space-time mathematically that would probably be more attractive to a constructivist.
First, one may reject the assumption that space-time is a continuum. The essential characteristics of a continuum, that it can be subdivided an arbitrary number of times and in arbitrary ways, and that it is qualitatively the same on all scales, seem impossible to reconcile with quantum mechanics. On very small scales it seems likely that the geometry and topology of space-time are disrupted by inherent quantum fluctuations and the notion of continued subdivision ceases to make sense. An indefinitely divisible continuum is an idealisation, useful provided the scale is not too small; it could be argued that a discrete space-time grid would be just as good an idealisation and would be easier to handle philosophically. Nevertheless, it would be more awkward mathematically and would lack desirable space-time symmetries. There are other possibilities besides a classical³ continuum and a discrete grid: for example, Chihara [1973, ÜV.7] argues that a model of space-time based on predicative analysis would be perfectly workable.
Although rejection of the space-time continuum is a possible position, and may eventually turn out to be the correct one, it is difficult to say any more about it until we have a better idea of what mathematical system we would use instead. Hence, for the rest of this section I shall assume that we do wish to treat space-time as indefinitely divisible, if only as an idealisation.
As a second possibility, one may accept the continuum but reject the idea that it is a set of points. Brouwer [1907] (along with many other contemporary mathematicians) regarded the continuum as a primitive entity, which was not to be identified with the totality of its points. Brouwer³s view of the continuum developed over time, but to simplify a complicated story [see van Stigt, 1990, Ü6.3] one can say that for Brouwer points and intervals were interdependent and complementary concepts, neither reducible to the other: points could be constructed on the (one-dimensional) continuum, thus dividing it into intervals; conversely, points could be defined by sequences of nested intervals. Thus a point is simply a construction that divides the continuum into two; the totality of all points is the totality of all possible ways of cutting the continuum. A constructivist would refuse to accept this totality of possibilities as a completed infinity; this is perfectly consistent with a realist attitude to the space-time continuum itself.
It is possible to develop geometry and topology in this spirit, with space conceived as a system of regions rather than a set of points; points are regarded as minimal regions, or identified with certain sets of regions, or excluded altogether [Tarski, 1927; Johnstone, 1983; Clarke, 1981 Clarke, , 1985 . Pointless³ topology has become popular recently amongst computer scientists interested in qualitative spatial reasoning [Varzi, 1996] , as it seems to offer a more parsimonious spatial ontology [Vieu, 1993] : if one is interested in modelling the spatial arrangement of a finite number of objects then it seems excessive to begin by positing an uncountable infinity of unobservable points. The factors that make pointless topology computationally attractive also make it philosophically attractive. Nevertheless, it is hard to capitalise on these apparent advantages: pointless versions of topology tend simply to mimic conventional topology [Pratt & Lemon, 1997] . No pointless topology that has advantages over point-based topology from a constructivist point of view has yet been developed.
A third approach is to use real numbers to represent points, in the usual way, but to use an unorthodox theory of the reals. In synthetic differential geometry [Kock, 1981] , use is made of infinitesimal real numbers whose squares are zero. For example, derivatives can be defined
A wide range of calculus problems in pure and applied mathematics become much easier in this formalism. Intuitionistic logic is essential here: it can be proved [Bell, 1998, p. 103 ] that
which would be a contradiction if we assumed that every number was either zero or non-zero.
This provides a counter-example to the misconception that any constructive physics must be a weakened version of a platonistic physics. Here is a theory that simplifies commonlyapplied parts of mathematics drastically and is only possible under intuitionistic logic. The extra distinctions introduced by rejection of the excluded middle, which are usually regarded as a nuisance when one is attempting to constructivise³ platonistic mathematics, make possible new kinds of mathematical theory with no platonistic counterpart.
However, before we rush to embrace synthetic differential geometry as the ideal setting for constructive applied mathematics, we should note several reasons for caution. First and most importantly, the theory has no known constructive interpretation. The fact that it avoids use of the excluded middle is not sufficient to make it meaningful to a constructivist. What is needed is a way of interpreting real numbers, the equality and ordering relations, and the arithmetic operations, in terms of mathematical constructions, and no such way is available. (The only consistency proofs known are in terms of topos theory.) Moreover, the theory contradicts constructive analysis as it is normally understood. For example, it implies that all real functions are infinitely differentiable, which may be appropriate for physics but rules out functions normally considered constructively acceptable, such as the modulus function. This does not seem compatible with the usual conception of reals as given by sequences of rational approximations.
Synthetic differential geometry also has some highly odd theorems, e.g., which seem to defy interpretation [Kock, 1981, Exercise 4.7] . Most disconcerting for the constructivist is the theorem, mentioned above, that there does not exist a non-zero infinitesimal.
Calculus is made to depend on a kind of number, non-zero infinitesimals, which can never be constructed.
For these reasons I do not propose adopting synthetic differential geometry, at least in its present form. Nevertheless, it is an illuminating example to make the point that we are not limited to mimicking traditional theories of the reals and that the use of intuitionistic logic may actually be an advantage.
I shall not attempt to develop these possibilities any further here. My conclusion is that the constructivist who wishes to develop a theory of space and time has a number of apparently viable options, which are not simply a subset of the options available to the platonist mathematician.
Conclusions
Scientific experiments cannot be used, in any straightforward way, to decide between rival philosophies of mathematics, because rival philosophers will interpret the experiments in terms of their own view of mathematics. Thus, platonists and constructivists may both observe inexhaustible systems in the physical world, but they will conceive them in very different ways. Platonists will regard them as isomorphic to pure-mathematical completed infinities and hence as providing a kind of pragmatic justification for their own platonism. Constructivists have a variety of other ways of regarding them, depending on their views on mereology and the determinateness of physical fact. They may accept the concept of a physical system³s being a model of Peano³s axioms, provided the second-order quantifiers can be given a convincing physical meaning, but they will not expect all such models to be isomorphic.
Platonists and constructivists also think of the small-scale structure of space and time in different ways. Platonists readily assume that it is isomorphic to a four-dimensional mathematical continuum, conceived as an uncountable set. Constructivists regard the true structure of space and time as an open empirical question. It is an advantage of constructivism that it stimulates us to consider alternative mathematical treatments, as suggested in Ü4; constructivism permits alternative ways of handling infinity and infinitesimals, which may be of use to physics once physicists become familiar with them.
Abstract
This paper examines the problem of extending the programme of mathematical constructivism to applied mathematics. I am not concerned with the question of whether conventional mathematical physics makes essential use of the principle of excluded middle, but rather with the more fundamental question of whether the concept of physical infinity is constructively intelligible. I consider two kinds of physical infinity: a countably infinite constellation of stars and the infinitely divisible space-time continuum. I argue (contrary to Hellman) that these do not pose any insuperable problem for constructivism, and that constructivism may have a useful new perspective to offer on physics.
